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Introduction
In 2008, Michelle Rhee graced the cover of TIME magazine, pictured in
front of a blackboard, holding a broom next to the caption, “How to Fix America’s
Schools.” Rhee, the former chancellor of D.C. public schools, has become one of
the most recognizable and polarizing faces in the contemporary education movement,
epitomizing the new wave of relatively young, hard-charging, data-driven, noexcuses reformers. Rhee became controversial for her blunt personality and taking
on the formidable teachers union. Her plans were two-fold: First, she wanted to
evaluate teachers using their students’ standardized test scores. Second, she wanted to
compensate teachers according to their evaluation scores. After three years in office,
Rhee resigned.
In 2008, Barak Obama was also elected to office. Soon after, under the
leadership of his Education Secretary, Arne Duncan, President Obama launched
an extensive grant competition for cash-strapped states, titled Race to the Top
(“RTT”). Seen in large part as a response to the much-criticized legacy of the Bush
Administration’s No Child Left Behind, the RTT initiative encouraged states to adopt
new education laws in order to receive federal funding. To apply, states had to agree
to allow teachers to be evaluated based on student achievement. The administration
also bolstered funding to the Teacher Incentive Fund, which provides funds for the
development and implementation of performance-based compensation.
The policies of both Race to the Top and Michelle Rhee characterize a
significant shift in education reform thinking and implementation which has taken
hold over the course of the past five years. There has been a heightened emphasis
on the importance of high quality teachers, and thus a push in education policies to
accurately evaluate them and couple incentives through compensation packages. As
a result, more than 30 states and countless districts have changed their policies since
2008 to reflect this new way of thinking (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013). Furthermore,
between 2006 and 2010, nationwide spending on perfomance pay increased from $99
million to $439 million (Blazer, 2011).
The Aldine Independent School District, located in Houston, Texas, is one
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of the many districts undergoing tremendous change. Having recently implemented
a new evaluation system and in the process of designing an aligned compensation
system, Aldine finds itself in the position of wondering how best to implement new
policies, particularly ones as high-stakes as determining the basis on which its teachers
are paid.
This paper closely examines the notion of compensation reform in American
public education, first exploring the history and implementation of “pay-forperformance” initiatives around the country and then focusing on teacher perceptions
of this increasingly popular reform. By surveying the Aldine ISD teaching force
regarding their attitudes towards compensation reform, I am able to make some
recommendations to the district, and districts in similar policy situations, regarding
how to best make the teacher population more receptive to accept such reform.
Background
In 2007, the single salary schedule was described as a “nearly universal feature
of American K-12 public school districts,” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Comprised
of a pay scale determined by years of experience (called “steps”) and education
credentials (called “lanes”), this compensation system has become ubiquitous in public
education. Yet the two components of the single salary schedule, years experience and
level of degree, have consistently failed to correlate with student outcomes leaving
districts basing teacher pay on factors unrelated to their performance in the classroom
(Goe & Stickler 2008, Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain 2005). Furthermore, high quality
teaching candidates may feel disinclined to pursue a career in teaching due to the low
salary as compared with other private sector positions, as well as the lack of financial
reward for doing their job well or better than their peers.
However, the climate is changing. States and districts are now experimenting
with the idea of a more market driven approach to teacher salaries, and more
importantly, using teacher compensation as a way to communicate their values and
priorities. Compensation reform, defined as aligning teacher financial incentives to
student outcomes, has two goals. First, it should drive the improvement of student
outcomes, or in more general terms, increase teacher productivity. Second, it should
facilitate the recruitment of better teaching candidates (Hershberg & Robertson-Kraft,
2009). Ultimately, compensation should reflect a district’s desire to reward skill
development, improved student outcomes, and provide a basis for career progression
(Odden & Wallace, 2008).
History
Compensation reform as a policy initiative is hardly a new idea. Over the
history of American public education, many large-scale changes have been made to
its pay structures. In the early 19th century, education primarily existed in the form
of small one-room schoolhouses, with teachers compensated in the form of room
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and board at homes of their students. As the economy developed as a result of the
Industrial Revolution, the demand for differentiated human capital increased. Teachers
were needed in higher numbers and increased quality as the nation developed a rapid
need for an educated work force.
A new compensation system accompanied this shift in school design. Under
the new “grade-based” system, teachers were paid in a way similar to workers in
other sectors of the economy, using a production model: teachers were compensated
according to the level of skill required to educate them. For example, it was considered
easier to teach young children than older children, and therefore the teachers of older
children were paid more. An unintended consequence of the grade-based system turned
out to be that the distribution of teaching positions, and therefore compensation, was
biased based on race and gender. Additionally, nepotism was rampant.
The Single Salary System
The solution to this problem arose with the increasing influence of labor
unions in the early 20th century. Teachers joined forces to advocate for the single salary
system, which determined compensation based on number of years of experience and
level of educational attainment. Pay was uniform for all teachers in a district with
the same qualifications, significantly reducing the instances of discrimination in the
teaching profession. The single salary system quickly spread through country and has
easily remained the most common compensation system in the country. There has
been little to no real movement in this compensation structure over the course of the
last 50 years, with 97% of districts having a single salary schedule in 1950, decreasing
by only one percentage point by 2007 (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
Yet the single salary system has not always been without controversy. In
1983, A Nation at Risk, rocked the education world. Detailing the mediocrity of
American schooling for the first time, the seminal report put new pressure on schools
to improve performance, particularly in comparison to the rest of the world (The
National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). It was in this context that
the first merit pay programs were initially conceived, offering financial incentives
ranging for individuals, groups of teachers, or entire school, and based on anything
from classroom observations, teacher portfolios, to student performance. Teacher
compensation was considered to be a relatively easy way to drive improvements
in student performance, encouraging teachers to work harder or better. Individual
districts and states experimented with implementing pay for performance systems,
but no individual initiative or compensation model ever grew large enough to rival
the single salary system, due in large part because teachers were unsupportive of the
measures. Additionally, as teacher compensation became a popular area of research,
merit pay consistently yielded mixed and confusing results regarding the program’s
success on student performance.
The strongest advocates of the single salary system were and continue to
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be the country’s teachers unions. Teachers initially rallied against the discriminatory
compensation practices in schools, organizing around their perceived injustice.
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, teachers advocated that all positions were
equally challenging and therefore deserved the same pay. Unions, in particular, had a
strong obligation to protect every due paying member, even those who do not perform
at high levels, resulting in a general opposition to significant differentiation between
the performance of teachers. Even today, in the face of countless studies indicating
the ineffectiveness of the single salary system, the American Federation of Teachers
argues for “enhancements” to the traditional approach rather than a complete overhaul
(American Federation of Teachers, 2014).
Teacher Evaluations
A discussion of compensation can hardly take place without examining
performance metrics. Studies have consistently revealed the ineffectiveness of
traditional methods of teacher evaluation. It is important to recognize that it is only
possible to compensate good teacher performance if performance can be accurately
measured. Progress in this regard has been hindered by the state of teacher evaluation
systems across the county. This capacity has been limited; both by laws and
policies governing teacher contracts as well accepted methodologies for measuring
performance.
Evaluation systems, historically, did not incorporate student outcomes
and reflected little differentiation between performance levels within the teaching
force. In 2009, a study surveying twelve districts across four states revealed that
the overwhelming majority of teacher evaluations did little to differentiate between
the performance of teachers, with 99% of teachers receiving a “satisfactory” rating.
Titled “The Widget Effect,” the report indicated that the information produced by the
evaluations had virtually no consequences, either through professional development
or dismissal (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009).w
The fact that teacher evaluations were not identifying discrepancies between
teacher performance does not mean that these discrepancies did not exist. For years,
there has been evidence of large variations between classrooms and teachers regarding
the growth of their students, suggesting that teaching has a substantial impact on student
achievement (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff 2011, Hanushek 2010). In fact, some have
gone so far as to say designing and implementing a high quality teacher evaluation
system could be the most effective way to raise student achievement (Staiger, Gordon,
& Kane, 2006). While non-school factors do influence student achievement, leading
research suggests that teacher quality, over things like school funding or studentteacher ratio, is the most import in-school factor to affect student outcomes (RAND
Education, 2012).
New Climate of Reform
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Over the course of the last five years, the country’s interest in developing
new methods to evaluate teachers has increased. This has resulted in a re-examination
of both internal and external factors that affect such evaluations and significantly
changed the laws that govern such evaluations.
Research
Researchers have come a long way in being able to isolate the specific effects
a teacher has on student learning through the use of standardized test scores. The two
primary ways to do this are to use a Value Added Model (VAM) or Student Growth
Percentiles (SGPs). VAMs use multiple previous years of testing data to predict scores
for individual students in a testing year. The model then averages the difference
between student’s actual scores and predicted scores to determine the teacher’s overall
added value (RAND Education, 2012).
Conversely, SGPs work by comparing student growth to their academically
similar peers. Students are assigned SGPs based on what their test scores were at the
end of a year as compared to all the students who had the same score on a test the
previous year. Therefore, an SGP of 50 would imply that the student’s growth was
exactly the median for the evaluated students (RAND Education, 2012). This method
works well because it focuses on student growth rather than achievement, which has
been shown to correlate highly with demographic factors such as socioeconomic and
minority status.
Without a doubt, the most extensive study ever conducted on the measurements
of teaching is the Methods of Effective Teaching study, a meticulous three-year research
endeavor sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They evaluated the
way different measures of teacher performance correlated with student outcomes,
examining different classroom observation rubrics, student perception surveys, and of
course, student scores and gains on state tests. They determined that effective teaching
can successfully be measured, but only through the use of multiple metrics that are
carefully balanced. Additionally, through a controlled experiment, the authors were
able to conclude that students of teachers who were rated as being highly effective
in 2009-2010 performed better at the end of the following year, confirming that high
quality teaching actually helps students to learn more. The study also means that there
are reliable ways to measure whether teaching is of this high quality caliber or not
(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2013). Research and methodologies dramatically
changed the discussion regarding compensation reform, because districts can now be
confident that they would be rewarding qualities that are integral to the overriding
goal: help students to learn.
Laws
Yet it has not been research alone that has contributed to the dawn of the
contemporary generation of education reform. Laws, at the district, state, and federal
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level, have changed radically over the course of the past five years. Most notable is
the Obama administration’s cornerstone education agenda, the $4 billion dollar grant
program titled Race to the Top. Passed as part of the 2009 stimulus package, RTT
was designed to incentivize reform of teacher evaluations, data management systems,
academic standards, turnaround school models, and school choice through offering
competitive grants to cash-strapped states in the wake of the 2008 financial recession.
Since then, there have been four years of state competitions, touting an impressive
participation record of 46 states and the District of Columbia adopting college- and
career-ready standards, as well as national increases in high school graduation and AP
participation rates (The Executive Office of the President, 2014).
Furthermore, RTT has created seismic changes in the way teacher
evaluations are conducted in most states. As of September 2013, 35 states and DC
mandate objective student outcome data (i.e. test scores) to be a significant or the most
significant factor in teacher evaluations. These changes in evaluations have also paved
the way for moderate changes in compensation reform nationwide, as six states now
directly link financial incentives to teacher evaluation outcomes (Doherty & Jacobs,
2013).
Other federal initiatives have also developed to incentivize compensation
reform. In 2009, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which had been founded three years
previously, received a $200 million boost in funding through the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act. TIF supports districts, states, and nonprofits by providing grant
money to design and implement performance-based teacher and principle pay systems
in high-needs schools. To qualify, applicants must present bold and innovative proposals
to establish pay scales that are differentiated by teacher performance, as defined by a
combination of teacher observations and student achievement gains (Eckert, 2013).
Ultimately, the education space looks very different today than it did five years ago,
prompting even more interest in compensation reform and performance-based pay.
Effects of Compensation Reform
Some question whether compensation reform is really the answer to
improving student achievement. Unfortunately, the existing literature on the effects of
compensation reform on student outcomes is murky at best. Many studies have been
done evaluating specific incentive-based compensation reform measures, ranging from
both individual- and school-level bonuses, based on anything from “knowledge base”
to special certification, to student achievement on standardized test scores. Because
every instance of teacher compensation reform has involved a different model of both
evaluation and incentive scheme, it is challenging to develop a clear explanation of
which models work and which do not. In a meta-analysis conducted by Podgursky
and Springer, eight distinct studies on compensation were aggregated. The studies,
conducted from 1997 to 2002, yielded conflicting results (Podgursky & Springer,
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2007).

These mixed results are exemplified by two subsequent studies, one conducted
by Figlio and Kenny in 2007 and the other by Roland Fryer in 2011. Figlio and Kenny
were the first to focus systematically examine the relationship between performance
incentives for individual teachers and student achievement across the United States
as a whole. The authors examined the National Education Longitudinal Survey and
determined that students achieved higher test scores in schools where bonuses offered
for good teacher performance. Additionally, they concluded that even relatively
minor implementations of incentive pay affected student outcomes in a statistically
significant way for both public and private schools. Furthermore they suggested that
a high quality merit pay program’s impact can translate to student attendance, or in
other words, is comparable to a one standard deviation decrease in days absent for the
average student (Figlio & Kenny, 2006).
Yet this study is seemingly contradicted by Fryer’s evaluation of New
York City’s teacher incentive system in 2011. Conducted by Roland Fryer, a noted
economist from Harvard, the study was conceptualized as a school-based randomized
trial in over two hundred NYC public schools. NYC implemented a teacher incentive
program between 2007 and 2010 where schools that met their performance goals
were given an allowance of money to distribute between teachers as they best saw fit.
Fryer’s analysis was done explicitly to determine how the teacher financial incentives
affected student achievement. He found that there was no evidence that teacher
incentives increased student performance, graduation, and attendance. Furthermore,
he concluded that there were no changes to student or teacher behavior as a result of
New York’s incentive scheme (Fryer, 2011).
The evaluations of these compensation systems reveal that, unsurprisingly,
merely aligning financial incentives to good performance does not consistently yield
higher student outcomes.
Compensation Reform in the Modern Era
While this literature is somewhat helpful in determining that compensation
reform alone cannot necessarily achieve better student outcomes, it does little to
address the current climate of contemporary education reform. The financial incentives
previously discussed are almost exclusively bonuses layered on top of the already
existing single salary system. Thus, it is different than the type of compensation
reform that is currently being discussed (which involves doing away with the single
salary schedule in its entirety). It also relies on teacher evaluation systems that are now
out of date and were frequently considered subjective by those participating in the
experiments.
The challenging nature of objectively measuring teaching has been titled
the “evaluation problem” in the classic performance management article written
by Murnane and Cohen (1986). They argued that due to the “imprecise” nature
of teaching, support for tying financial incentives to evaluation was doomed to be
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fleeting. As mentioned previously, over the course of the past five years there has been
a tremendous shift in focus regarding the evaluation of teachers, as administrators,
researchers and policy makers alike have taken enormous strides to identify what
constitutes high quality teaching.
Much of the previous literature on compensation reform makes the
assumption that there was a lack of motivation to teach well, which, compensation
reformers argue, could be increased by providing monetary incentives. It is far more
likely however, that evaluators lacked the adequate tools to recognize and support
highly effective teaching. It is thus reasonable to suspect that compensation that aligns
to this type of teacher evaluations might be more successful. Unfortunately, because
of the relatively recent development of this generation of evaluation systems, there are
only a few districts that have implemented new evaluation and compensation systems
and have been thoroughly evaluated. An exploration of these cases follows.
Denver
Denver’s strategic compensation reform originated in the late 1990s,
when Denver Public Schools and the local teacher unions joined forces to launch
a comprehensive evaluation and compensation system called ProComp. Under the
ProComp system, teachers have the opportunity to be rewarded for achievement in
four areas: knowledge and skills, comprehensive professional evaluation, market
incentives, and student growth. Authors Goldhaber and Walch sought to determine
whether the system succeeded in producing improved student achievement scores,
exploring three alternate pathways for how ProComp could actually cause student
growth. They explored whether teachers increased focus on their instructional abilities,
whether feedback and level of support cause professional improvement over time, or
the possibility that the system altered the recruitment and retention patterns of teachers
coming into and out of the district. The authors concluded that there was little to no
impact associated with individual teachers’ performance as a result of the ProComp
system (Goldhaber & Walch, 2011).
Chicago
Originally modeled after guidelines proposed by the Milken Family
Foundation, in 2007 Chicago began offering bonuses to teachers based on their
performance on a specific observation rubric. Bonuses were distributed at the school
level, making some schools “Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) schools” and the
remaining “non-TAP schools.”
The authors of the study, Glazerman and Seifullah, found that while teachers
at TAP schools benefit from increased mentoring from veteran teachers, there was
ultimately little evidence to suggest that the TAP program was responsible for raising
student achievement on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test. Ultimately, their data
indicated that there were heterogeneous results for test score impacts across subjects,
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years, and schools, yielding no overall relationship between the financial incentive
program and impact on math, reading, or science test scores (Glazerman & Seifullah,
2012).
District of Columbia
In 2009-2010, the District of Columbia Public School system (DCPS)
launched a new evaluation and compensation system, called IMPACT. Incorporating
both observation measures as well as student test scores, IMPACT developed
a reputation for having particularly “high-stakes”or in other words, significant
consequences, because teachers performing for multiple years at the highest levels
of the DCPS’s evaluation system were rewarded through both changes to their base
pay, or yearly compensation, as well as bonuses for outstanding behavior. Conversely,
teachers who failed to earn proficient ratings for multiple years would be forced to
leave.
The authors utilized a regression-discontinuity (RD) design to examine
the difference in performance between teachers just above and below the threshold
for determining a teacher’s evaluation label (such as “Minimally Effective” or
“Effective”). This research design was particularly interesting because it allowed for
a controlled look at how the incentive associated with the performance label affected
student growth, as there were serious consequences associated with the difference
of labels. However, teachers performing just above or below a threshold would be
considered to have relatively comparable quality of teaching. Therefore, distinct
changes in student growth could be attributed to the effects of the evaluation label, or
the incentives designed by the “high-stakes” system.
They determined through this RD analysis that there were substantial
effects as a result of IMPACT’s performance management system, resulting in both
voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers and improving the performance of
high-performing teachers (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013).
Again, however, the results are unclear. It seems that merely implementing
a new evaluation and compensation system, even when the evaluations are tied to
student performance, is not sufficient to consistently yield student growth. In light of
this information, policymakers must ask, “Why do some systems work while others
do not?” This question is at the heart of the design process for districts, including
Aldine, as they move in the direction of both new evaluation and compensation
systems. While it may be possible to make some statements about the design and
implementation of the system itself, to do so would disregard a critical component of
the initiative’s ultimate success: teachers. There is little, if any information in these
studies about teacher motivation and behavior, reflecting an incomplete understanding
of the teaching force and a lapse in the data for analysis . The teaching force is far from
a monolith, with abundant differentiation between the teachers, schools, and districts
where the policies were implemented. In other words, there needs to be sufficient
information such that policy makers can stop asking which reforms “will work” and
Volume 10 | Spring 2015

107

Teacher Attitudes Towards Performance-Based Compensation Reform
begin asking which reforms will be implementable under what conditions (Honig,
2006). It is reasonable to consider that maybe the reason that there is differentiation
in the results of the pay for performance programs is that there was support for the
programs in some places and not others.
Existing Literature on Teacher Attitudes Towards Compensation Reform
While there is some existing research on teacher attitudes towards
performance-based compensation, it is far from extensive. The majority of research in
this field, as previously noted, has been devoted to compensation reform’s effectiveness
in achieving its goals of better student performance. Yet as the previous section of this
paper has demonstrated, not only is the research split on the issue of effectiveness, but
ultimately, the results of any one specific initiative mean little without understanding
the attitudes toward the reform. To better understand this component, some researchers
have analyzed surveys, with samples ranging from individual schools and school
districts to the country as a whole. They have determined that a variety of factors
influence teacher perceptions of compensation reform.
Overview
In general, teachers seem to be somewhat inclined to support certain types
of alignments between performance in the classroom and compensation. Additionally,
once teachers receive some kind of performance pay, they tend to develop stronger
support for it (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).
Teacher Level Factors
Personality
For the most part, there is little evidence to suggest that individual personality
traits or work values matter when teachers consider performance pay (CECR Research
Synthesis, 2010).
Experience
Some research supports the idea that teachers with more years in the classroom
are less supportive of performance pay than their younger counterparts (Ballou &
Podgursky 1993, Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgomaster, 2007). Interestingly, a
comparison study between Generation Y teachers and older teachers revealed that
while younger teachers tend to favor financial incentives for those who “consistently
work harder, putting in more time and effort than other teachers,” it was the older
teachers that wanted increased compensation for teachers with lower performing
schools, who specialize in harder-to-fill subjects, and whose standardized test scores
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were higher (Coggshall, Ott, Behrstock, & Lasagna, 2010). These results suggest that
experience does affect attitudes towards financial incentives, but not necessarily in a
consistent way.
System Level Factors
Unsurprisingly, results indicate that the design and implementation of both
the evaluation system and compensation system matter when considering teacher
support for performance-based pay.
Design
Multiple studies have examined varying types of performance incentives,
comparing individualized bonuses to school-wide motivations, as well as the basis
for the bonuses, such as high student achievement or filling hard-to-staff positions.
One study determined that teachers are more likely to favor stipends for additional
responsibilities or possibilities for faster career advancement (Kelley, Odden,
Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000). Most teachers support incentive pay for extra teacher
effort and difficult teaching situations, and 42% supported higher pay for teaching
hard-to-fill subjects (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003). Additionally, teachers support
financial incentives in the form of bonuses more than they support changes to the base
pay, or single salary system.
Yet, according to a study conducted by Jacob and Springer in 2008, teachers
are almost evenly split on whether pay based on individual performance would
be favorable to a school-based alternative (Jacob & Springer, 2008). There is also
evidence that specific design features, such as how easily a system can be influenced
or manipulated by teachers, affect their perceptions. According to Milanowski (2006),
this idea suggests that teacher-input in the design process is important.
Trust in the Evaluation System
Furthermore, teachers’ trust in the evaluation and compensation system is
essential (Cornett & Gaines 1994, Milanowski 2006, Murnane & Cohen 1986). In
2002, Kelly, Heneman, and Milanowski found that the extent to which teachers trusted
the school system as a whole, as well as the perceived fairness and transparency of the
pay system, correlated strongly with teachers’ support for performance-based pay. It
is no surprise, then, that the evaluation system also matters tremendously. On average,
teachers do not trust evaluations conducted by their school principles because they feel
that they are too subjective (Baratz-Snowden, 2007).
Yet this does not mean that teachers are more accepting of the use of
standardized test scores to measure their performance. A national survey reported
that while 62% favored financial rewards for teachers who received outstanding
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principal evaluations, a mere 38% favored rewards for students scoring higher on
performance measures (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003). This information suggests
that teachers do not, on average, trust any way of measuring their performance and
prefer observation data to student test scores.
School Level Factors
Additionally, there is ample information regarding the way school culture
affects teacher attitudes towards performance pay.
Administration
Multiple studies report that trust in management, specifically the school
principal, is essential, as teachers who had faith in their administration also had more
support for merit pay (Milanowski 2006, Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgonmaster
2007).
Professional Community
There is also extensive research on the effects of a professional community
on teachers’ acceptance of compensation reform. Teachers with more trust and
respect for their peers were less supportive of merit pay (Goldhaber, DeArmond, &
DeBurgonmaster, 2007). Furthermore, teachers widely reported that implementing
a compensation system that is aligned to performance would have the potential to
disrupt school culture. In an evaluation of the Texas DATE program, 70% of districts
reported concerns about the program’s potential to diminish professional relationships
(Springer, et al., 2010), and in national surveys, somewhere between 56% and 63%
of teachers noted that they thought pay for performance would engender unhealthy
competition and jealousy and threaten the collaborative culture of teaching. (Farkas,
Johnson, & Duffett 2003), Jacob & Springer 2008)
School Performance
Research has also found that performance of the school as a whole weakly and
inversely correlates with attitudes regarding merit pay, as teachers in low-performing
schools were more supportive than high performing schools (Ballou & Podgursky,
1993). Conversely, the same authors also concluded that the level of pay a teacher
receives at his or her school seems to have no effect on his or her attitude (Ballou &
Podgursky, 1993).
The impact of school level factors is additionally magnified by Milanowski’s
2006 study, which presents interesting data on the socialization of teachers, suggesting
that teachers are heavily influenced by the opinions of their surrounding peers.
Take-Aways from Existing Literature
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There are a few major points that should be taken from this collection of research. First,
context matters. There are a wide variety of factors that affect teacher perceptions of
performance-based pay, and therefore every teaching force can be expected to react
a little differently depending on the design and implementation of the evaluation and
compensation system, the make-up of the teaching force as whole and the culture
existing within their schools. It is important to recognize, therefore, that teacher
attitudes in different districts, under the influence of different policies and systems
will have differing feelings on compensation reform.
Second, teacher attitudes vary according to three sets of factors: teacher level,
system level, and school level. Mixed results can be found within each of these broad
categories, making it challenging for policy makers to predict attitudes ahead of time.
Third, this already complicated picture becomes increasingly complex as the
contemporary education climate is factored into the situation. As the education climate
changes rapidly, attitudes of teachers adapt along with it. In addition to the changes
in evaluation and compensation laws, the “younger” teachers in the majority of the
surveyed studies are continuing on in the classroom while the stereotypical veteran
opposition may be phasing out. Finally, support for compensation reform nationally
(amongst teachers and non-teachers alike) is ascending. A 2010 Gallup poll found that
72% of public school parents and 71% of adults nationwide believe pay should be
aligned to teaching quality (Bushaw & Lopez, 2010).
These findings paint a very different picture of compensation reform than
existed fifteen years ago, creating a complicated landscape for policy makers who
wish to experiment with compensation reform in their district. There is indication
that teacher support matters, but given the wide variety of factors that affect teacher
attitudes, it is challenging to figure out exactly where compensation reform will
succeed in achieving its desired goals. Additionally, even when fully executed, it still
remains unclear whether the system will necessarily yield higher student achievement.
Regardless, a compensation system can serve as a way to reflect district values
regarding rewarding teacher performance and serve as recruitment tactic for highly
motivated graduates considering teaching. As district leadership, such as that in the
Aldine Independent School District, contemplates the design and implementation of a
new compensation system that is aligned to performance, it will be important that they
consider existing teacher attitudes.
The Case of Aldine ISD
About Aldine
Operation Public Education, a University of Pennsylvania-affiliated
education-consulting group, partnered with the Aldine Independent School District
in 2011. Aldine is located just inside the outer edge of Houston more resembles a
semi-rural, small town than one of the fastest growing cities in America. The district
consists of only Title I schools and serves over 67,000 students. Demographically,
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the students are almost exclusively of racial minorities, with 70.8% identifying as
Hispanic, 25.1% identifying as African American, and only two percent identifying as
white. The district has a teaching force of 4,200 and oversees 78 campuses, rendering
it the 10th largest district in the state (Aldine Independent School District, 2014).
Under the leadership of OPE Director, Dr. Theodore Hershberg and Assistant
Director, Claire Robertson-Kraft, the team worked with district leadership to design
and implement a new performance management system, called INVEST. INVEST
consists of two large components, a teacher observation portion and a student growth
portion, each contributing 50% of a teacher’s overall evaluation score. The observation
system uses Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching, which divides the practice
of teaching into four distinct and separate domains:
Domain 1: Planning and Preparation
Domain 2: The Classroom Environment
Domain 3: Instruction
Domain 4: Professional Responsibilities
Assessment in each domain yields an overall label of one of the following:
ineffective, needs improvement, effective or highly effective. Observations are usually
conducted by principals or assistant principals, who are instructed to both schedule
times for planned formal observations as well as conduct surprise “walk-throughs”
throughout the course of the year.
To measure student growth, the district uses student growth percentiles
(SGPs). SGPs measure the progression of a child as compared to his peers with
similar test scores from the previous year. This way of measuring growth allows
for results to be normed across the district and for students to serve as their own
control. To calculate SGPs, AISD uses the results from the Texas state exams. After
one year of pilot implementation of INVEST, the team shifted focus to the alignment
of compensation to the new evaluation system. A working group, consisting of
district teachers, principles, and support staff, was assembled to help design a system
that would be amenable to the teaching force as whole. The district hopes to finish
designing the system by the end of the 2013-2014 school year and run a shadow pilot
the following year, ultimately implementing a new compensation system in fall of
2015.
Research Purpose, Design, and Methodology
As evidenced by the literature review, there is significant evidence to
suggest that teacher attitudes towards a performance management system affect their
motivation. Additionally, multiple studies indicate that teacher attitudes towards
performance-based compensation varies depending on a variety of teacher-, school-,
and district-level characteristics. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to determine
the current attitudes of Aldine teachers towards implementing a new compensation
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system. These observations can then be used to make policy recommendations to
OPE, Aldine ISD, and the many districts in similar situations to Aldine regarding how
to best condition the teaching force to be amenable to this type of high-stakes reform.
The data used in this study was collected by OPE as part of a larger research project
on the implementation of INVEST.
In order to evaluate the attitudes of teachers, I used data collected from two
sets of surveys administered to teachers in Fall of 2012 and Spring of 2013. I analyzed
results only from those teachers who completed both surveys and taught in a school
where INVEST was piloted that year. On the spring survey, teachers were asked to
respond the question, “Teachers should be financially rewarded for outstanding
performance” on a five point scale (ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree
strongly”). Their responses were coded, with “disagree strongly” corresponding to 1
and “agree strongly” to 5, allowing the extent of their support to be analyzed in relation
to their strength of agreement towards other statements regarding their personality,
environment, and feelings regarding the design and implementation of the evaluation
system. Additionally, for the purposes of this paper, I will use performance pay and
merit pay synonymously, and defined as a compensation system that aligns financial
incentives to teacher performance.
Findings
Overall
When examined overall for my sample, 1038 teachers, it seems the teachers
have a slightly favorable impression of performance-based pay. Their total mean of 3.62
with a standard deviation of 1.19 suggests that teachers are, on average, somewhere
between neutral and positive regarding aligning financial rewards to performance in
the classroom.
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This histograph indicates that while the majority of teachers are not opposed
to performance-based pay, about a quarter of teachers oppose or strongly oppose this
type of compensation system. This type of more general information provides us with
a broad picture of teacher perceptions of merit pay, it does not give any insight into
which teachers support or oppose, or why a specific group of teachers might believe
what they do. In order to develop a more detailed profile of teacher attitudes towards
performance-based pay, I looked at three different areas that might affect their beliefs:
characteristics of the individual teachers, their perceptions of the evaluation system,
and the conditions of their school.
Teacher Level Characteristics
Teacher level characteristics are defined, for my purposes, as those traits or
characteristics that affect a teacher in an individualized way. This means that within
a given school, the teaching staff would vary for this set of factors, such as years of
experience, grade taught, overall performance outcome score, and personality type.
Experience
Table 1: Means by Years Experience: First Years – Results from t-test
Years Teaching
First years

Mean (SD)

3.77 (1.240)

Teachers not in their first year 3.59 (1.200)
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001		
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Table 2: Means by Years Experience: Veterans – Results from t-test
Years Teaching
Veterans

Mean (SD)

3.46 (1.267)

Teachers with 9 years or 3.74 (1.123)
less of experience
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001

N

501**
517**

I performed a t-test to examine the mean responses of two groups of teachers:
first years, and veterans (ten years or more experience). I found that the number of
years experience did matter, as determined by comparing means between teachers who
met a certain experience level (such as 1 year experience) to the rest of the teaching
population in Aldine. The results from this analysis reveal that teachers with 10 years
or more of experience, or veterans, have significantly less support for performance pay
than teachers who have been teaching for less time. These results are consistent with
the body of literature.
Performance
Table 3: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Performance
Measures
Performance Measure

N

Pearson Correlation

SGP 2012

242

0.041

SGP 2013
SGP 2011

Danielson – Overall Domain 1
Danielson – Overall Domain 2
Danielson – Overall Domain 3
Danielson – Overall Domain 4

Danielson 2013
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001

334
188

1036
1038
1038
1036
1038

0.045

-0.138
0.038

0.083**
0.041
0.059
0.060

The data indicates that there is essentially no relationship between
performance on the evaluation system and desire to be paid in accordance with it. This
finding would be rather surprising if we assumed that teachers based their perception
of performance pay on their potential payoff. Conceptualizing teachers in this way
would lead one to intuitively assume that the teachers who performed well on the
system would want to be compensated accordingly. Conversely, one would think that
teachers who had more to lose by adopting a system that aligns to their evaluation
scores would be stronger opponents. However, this pattern has no support from the
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data, implying that teachers’ attitudes are not informed by personal incentives.
Labels Matter
Table 4: Means by Label on Danielson Rubric		
2013 Danielson Label

Mean (SD)

N

Needs Improvement

3.28 (1.221)

99

Ineffective
Effective

Highly Effective

3.88 (0.781)
3.64 (1.187)
3.74 (1.217)

17
805
116

Table 4 presents the means for teacher support of performance pay
disaggregated by Danielson “label,” or the category assigned to a teacher based on his
or her score on the Danielson rubric. Each category has discrete thresholds for scores,
meaning that two teachers that do not differ much in numerical score may fall into
two different categories. Table 3 demonstrated that there is no statistically significant
relationship between how an individual scores on Danielson and their perception of
merit pay. However, there is a relationship in accordance with the Danielson label.
The high mean for Ineffective teachers can be disregarded due to the small
sample size. However, there is a large and statistically significant (p = 0.006) difference
between the teachers in the Needs Improvement and Highly Effective categories.
This finding implies that categorization affects teachers’ perception of the
evaluation system. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that there is not a relationship between the
continuous score on Danielson and their perceptions (Table 3) but only the categorical
score on Danielson and their perceptions, which suggests that the rating matters. To
clarify, this does not mean that better teachers always have more favorable perceptions,
but rather that the teachers that are categorized as better have better attitudes. The
conclusion that one can draw from this finding is that the people around the margins
of the divisions between Danielson labels will behave very differently based on how
they’re assigned.
This finding is very interesting when contextualized in the results from
Thomas Dee and James Wyckoff’s 2013 study on Washington DC’s evaluation and
compensation system, IMPACT. As previously mentioned, Dee and Wyckoff used a
regression-discontinuity design for their analysis, examining teachers who were just
above and below the threshold for a performance label in the evaluation system. The
authors concluded that the incentives associated with the label had to be the basis for
the differences in teacher retention and student performance between the teachers who
were just above or below a threshold.
The findings from this analysis, however, might suggest that it is the label
itself that causes some of the effects, not necessarily the consequences attached. Aldine
teachers, under the INVEST system, have none of the high-stakes consequences
attached to evaluation under DC’s IMPACT system. This means that merely being
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labeled under the performance management system is capable of affecting attitudes
and perceptions of aspects of the system, something not necessarily accounted for in
Dee and Wyckoff’s research. Another key difference between this analysis and Dee
and Wyckoff’s work is that the DC study examined behaviors associated with the
labels, such as teacher retention and changes in student growth scores.
Personality
Table 5: Correlations Between Personality Traits and Support for Performance Pay
Personality Trait

Grit
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001

Pearson Correlation
0.231**

Table 6: Questions Comprising Personality Scales
Scale
Grit

Survey Questions

Right now, my interest in teaching is about the same as it was before the
school year began
I am working as hard as I did at the beginning of the school year
Lately, setbacks have not discouraged me
Every day, I actively try to improve my teaching
Nothing is more important to me than improving my teaching

I found no literature regarding how personality type might influence attitudes
towards performance-based pay. My data shows that while most tested personality
traits seem to barely correlate, if at all, grit is unique in that it correlates moderately
with the belief that teachers should be compensated according to their classroom
performance. Grit is a term originally coined by Angela Duckworth and is defined
as is “the tendency to sustain interest in and effort toward very long-term goals”
(Duckworth, Matthews, Kelly, & Peterson, 2007). Grouped with traits such as selfcontrol and resilience, grit is very much associated with being able to commit to and
achieve long-term goals, even when obstacles may get in the way.
The moderate correlation between grit and positive perception of performance
incentives makes some intuitive sense. Teachers who are resilient and capable of
sticking with a goal even when it becomes challenging might see what occurs in their
classroom more within their control, and therefore feel better about being evaluated
and, therefore, compensated according to what occurs there. Gritty teachers do not
become discouraged by initial set backs, maintaining a belief that their long-term goal
is achievable. This attitude can be easily applied to INVEST, where gritty teachers
would believe that it was possible to score highly on the evaluation system, and
therefore be compensated fairly and well.
Perception Of the Evaluation System
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Table 7: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Perception of the
Evaluation System
Perception of the System

Pearson Correlation

INVEST Fairness Measures Scale

0.344**

Evaluation Accurate and Fair Scale
Evaluation Feedback and Growth Scale

Danielson Framework Overall is Accurate and Fair

0.274**
0.298**
0.276**

SGP is an accurate and fair measure for teaching performance 0.298**
INVEST Understanding Scale

INVEST has positive impact in Aldine ISD

Evaluation Accurate and Fair Scale
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001		

0.274**
0.344**
0.298**

Table 8: Questions Comprising Perception of Evaluation Scales
Scale

Survey Questions

Evaluation
My evaluator’s observations of my classroom this year
Accurate and Fair accurately captured by performance as a teacher

Overall, the teacher evaluation system used this year was fair
I agree with my evaluator’s assessment of my performance
My evaluator’s observations of my classroom this year
accurately captured by performance as a teacher

Overall, the teacher evaluation system used this year was fair

INVEST Fairness Domain 1 (Planning and Preparation) is accurate and fair.
Measures Scale
Domain 2 (Classroom Environment) is accurate and fair
Domain 3 (Classroom Instruction) is accurate and fair

Domain 4 (Professional Responsibilities) is accurate and fair

Evaluation
Feedback and
Growth

Student Growth Percentiles are an accurate and fair measure of
my teaching performance

INVEST provides specific feedback on areas to improve my
teaching
INVEST provides the support I need to improve my teaching

The professional development I received this year was aligned
to INVEST
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INVEST will lead to improvements in student achievement
INVEST will help me improve my teaching
INVEST will support teacher development

It is obvious that perception of the evaluation system is an important factor
in influencing a teacher’s attitude towards performance-based pay. All of the tested
measures regarding teacher’s perceptions of INVEST were correlated with their
belief in merit pay. This result is hardly surprising, as teachers undoubtedly want
financial incentives that they feel reflect attainable goals. In other words, if people
feel their evaluation does not reflect an objective or complete picture of their work
in the classroom, it is unlikely that they would want any sort of high stakes decision
to be associated with it. Of particular note is the strength of the relationship between
the INVEST Fairness Measure scale and the perception of performance pay, with
a correlation of 0.344 that is significant at the p<.01 level. Yet when one looks at
the components of INVEST including the observation evaluation inputs, the student
growth inputs, and the feedback outputs, it’s clear that no one element correlates as
strongly as belief in the fairness of the system as a whole.
Similarly, there is a moderate relationship between a belief that INVEST has a
positive impact in Aldine and desire to be compensated according to the performance.
Because of the lack of detail regarding the compensation-related question, it is
impossible to know the exact motivations behind any given response. However, I
would speculate that the type of teacher who would appreciate the rationale behind the
design of INVEST, and therefore think it would benefit AISD as a whole, would also
appreciate the way performance-based compensation reform would value high quality
teaching.
School Level Characteristics
School level characteristics are those factors that deal with the environment
of the school as a whole and would not be expected to vary considerably for individual
teachers within any one school. For the purposes of this paper, these school level
characteristics mostly exist of teachers’ perceptions of school leadership and the
general environment of the school.
Table 9: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Perception of
School Culture
Perception of the System

Pearson Correlation

Level of support scale

0.24**

Quality of administration scale
Level of control scale

Professional community scale

0.22**
0.23**
0.19**
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Leadership scale

Quality of administration scale

Level of support scale
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001		

0.22**
0.22**
0.24**

Table 10: Questions Comprising School Culture Scales
Scale

Survey Questions

Quality of Administration The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is
supportive and encouraging

My principal enforces school rules for student conduct
and backs me up when I need it

Level of Support

The principal knows what kind of school he or she
wants and has communicated that to the staff

I am given the support I need to teach students with
special needs
Necessary materials such as textbooks, supplies, and
copy machines are available as needed by the staff

Level of control scale

I receive a great deal of support from parents for the
work that I do
I have control over selecting content, topics, and skills
to be taught in my classroom
I have control over selecting teaching techniques I use
in the classroom

Professional community
scale

I have control over disciplining students

Rules for student behavior are consistently enforced by
teachers in this school, even for students who are not in
their classes
Most of my colleagues share my beliefs and values
about what the central mission of the school should be

Leadership scale

There is a great deal of cooperative effort among the
staff members
My principal makes clear to his or her staff expectations
for meeting instructional goals
My principal communicates a clear vision for our school

My principal presses teachers to implement what they
have learned in professional development
My principal knows what’s going on in my classroom
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It’s OK to discuss feelings, worries, and frustrations
with my principals
I trust my principal at his or her word

The principal at this school is an effective manager who
makes the school run smoothly
I really respect my principal as an educator

The data suggests that there is a moderate relationship between most school level
factors and perception of performance pay. Both teachers’ perceptions of the quality
of their administration and leadership have strong correlations of 0.22, significant at
the p<.01 level. This finding makes a lot of sense in the context of the new evaluation
system. If teachers are confident in the capabilities and leadership of their school
administration, it is likely they believe INVEST was implemented in a reasonably
effective and fair way. In other words, teachers probably trust their administration to
make high-stakes decisions, such as determining their compensation.
Closely related to this interpretation of the importance of administration is
the relationship between level of support and perception of merit pay. It is reasonable
to think that if teachers feel they have an adversarial relationship with their bosses
or co-workers, they might not want the administration to have any control over their
compensation through the evaluation process. Also, level of support could reflect how
confident a teacher is in her administration’s ability to provide the type of feedback
that will help her to improve and thrive.
Additionally, it is important to note the positive relationship between
perception of a strong professional community and attitude toward performance pay.
This finding is interesting because it is contrary to considerable literature regarding
teacher sentiments on merit pay (Jacob and Springer 2008, Goldhaber 2007). Most
researchers have found that teachers who have trusting and collaborative relationships
with their co-workers tend to feel less support for compensation systems that align pay
with performance. This has traditionally been attributed to a sense of competition that
develops between teachers when they are eligible for the same financial incentives.
However, this finding demonstrates why it is important to conduct this sort of
research on the new generation of teacher evaluations and compensation systems. A
compensation system that redesigns the single salary schedule to align to performance
metrics, rather than offering zero-sum bonuses on top of it, mitigates this issue entirely.
There would be no personal cost to being supportive and collaborative in this new type
of compensation and evaluation system. The positive relationship demonstrated by the
findings suggests that teachers understand this.
Finally, school characteristics vary across different types of schools, as does
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay. While some schools have a mean support
level of 4.04, others have means that are below 3.0. It is unlikely that these differences
are due to chance. It is easy to see they way school culture and working conditions
affect teacher attitudes.
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Discussion
The findings from my analysis of teacher surveys from the Aldine school
district both confirm and weaken existing literature regarding teacher attitudes
towards performance-based compensation. Results from the AISD teaching force
regarding their general acceptance of performance-based compensation supported
existing literature. Additionally, like every major study previously published on
teacher attitudes, I also found that teachers more years experience had a stronger
opposition to merit pay than their less experienced peers. Furthermore, my findings
strengthen existing literature regarding the positive relationship between having trust
in both the design of the system itself, as well as the administration, and perception
of performance pay. However, Aldine teachers contributed new information to the
field regarding the effects of personality on teacher attitudes. While previous literature
suggested that personality did not affect attitudes, I found that one personality trait
had a strong correlation with perception of performance pay: grit. Probably due to
its relatively recent coinage, grit and resilience were two traits not tested in previous
studies.
These supports and deviations from the previous literature provide interesting
insight into teacher attitudes towards the contemporary age of education reform. No
study has yet been conducted on teacher attitudes towards compensation reform in a
district that is using this modern of an evaluation system. Additionally, while most
literature examined a specific proposed compensation initiative, this survey treats
the compensation system as a very abstract concept. The Aldine Independent School
District, and its evaluation system, INVEST, provide the perfect opportunity to explore
how teachers feel not only about performance-based compensation in a theoretical
sense, but how they feel about merit pay at this particular time of intense transition in
the district and country.
It is in this context that a few larger themes emerge regarding how teachers
perceive performance-based pay.
Teacher Level Factor: Control
A teacher’s sense of control refers to her belief that her actions can and will
yield a predictable and desired outcome. It is intuitive to think that teachers would want
to be evaluated and compensated on elements of their profession that are within their
control, where their choices, work ethic, and talent are recognized and rewarded, while
they are not punished for things that are outside their sphere of influence. Therefore it
is unsurprising that teachers who feel that they have more control both as an individual
in their classroom and in the school have higher support for performance-based pay.
This explanation is supported by the finding that grit has a strong positive
correlation with acceptance of merit pay. Gritty teachers are those who are capable
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of staying committed to long-term goals, such as performance goals, even when
encountering resistance. These professionals see challenges as merely temporary
obstacles, because they know that they can control, to a reasonable extent, what their
future will hold.
System-Level Factor: Fairness
Teacher perceptions of the INVEST system had the strongest relationship
with their support of compensation reform. Teachers who thought that INVEST was
designed fairly and predicted it would have a positive impact on the district were
very supportive of using the evaluation system to determine their pay. Conversely,
teachers who were skeptical of the evaluation system, were also skeptical of applying
it to compensation decisions. It is intuitive that teachers want to feel that high stakes
decisions are being made fairly, and do not want to be held accountable for things that
they perceive as being outside their purview.
Additionally, a key finding from this study was that interaction with the
evaluation system actually affected teacher attitudes towards compensation, as an
assigned label on the Danielson rubric had a much stronger relationship with perception
of performance pay than the outcome scores. This means that Aldine will have to be
cautious regarding how information about these labels is presented to the teaching
force, as teachers are serious about the category ascribed to them.
These findings also demonstrate the importance of teacher voice in the design
and implementation process for new policies. Teachers who have had a meaningful
role in creating the policy will be more likely to embrace it when it is implemented.
School-Level Factor: Trust
School culture seems to also being playing a large role in determining
teachers’ attitudes towards performance pay. This is particularly true regarding teacher
trust in both their peers and their administration.
The data indicates that there is a weak positive correlation between the
strength of a school’s professional community and its teachers’ perceptions of merit
pay. This finding contradicts all of the existing research regarding perceptions of
professional communities, which suggest that teachers dislike financial incentives
because it weakens a collaborative environment in a school community. Aldine
teachers also indicated a strong relationship between trust in their administration and
their attitude toward performance pay. Both of these elements can contribute to the
feeling of support at a school, including aspects such as the availability of materials
and instructional help. When tested for specifically, level of support had the strongest
positive correlation of any school-level factor.
This explanation of school culture supports Milanowski’s theory of
socialization, or that the opinions of the teachers whom work with matter significantly
when determining views on things that require employer discretion, such as merit
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pay (2006). This argument for socialization provides greater nuance to the data
regarding professional community, as the teaching force at a school affects any
individual teacher’s perception through not only their level of support (in the form of a
professional community). By sharing opinions on performance pay, teachers are likely
to influence each other.
Limitations and Areas for Further Exploration
It is important to note that there are some significant sources of error in this
analysis. First, unlike much of the literature previously discussed in this paper, the
survey I used for my analysis was not designed with the intent of determining teacher
attitudes towards performance pay. Rather, there was only one question that directly
mentioned compensation in the administered surveys, and therefore is incapable of
providing as detailed results as would be possible with a survey designed for this
express purpose.
Second, the one question was only administered one time. The question that
we are interested in was only asked on the second survey, meaning that there is no
information about the way attitudes regarding performance pay changed over the course
of the year as the evaluation system was being piloted. Third, it is also important to
note that the question at hand was administered during the spring survey, after INVEST
had been piloted for a full year. As to be expected with the implementation of any
new evaluation system, teacher perceptions of their administration and school culture
deteriorated somewhat from the beginning to the end of the year. This can be explained
by teachers’ frustration with the design of the system, the way it was communicated to
them, their ultimate performance, or just a general resistance to change. However, it is
reasonable to assume that all of these factors could influence a slightly more negative
perception of performance-based pay than would have presented at the beginning of
the year had teachers been asked to respond at that time.
There are many aspects of teacher attitudes towards performance-based pay
that were not adequately explored in a study of this scope. Opportunities for future
research include expanding the conception to performance pay to examine different
types of performance-based compensation initiatives in greater detail. Unlike previous
literature, my study cannot provide any insight into which types of compensation
reform (such as stipends for hard to staff positions versus changes to base pay due
to INVEST ratings) teachers support or oppose. This information could be incredibly
useful to a district as they approach the design of a new compensation system.
Additionally, to delve deeper into my findings, qualitative and quantitative
data regarding school culture, control, and perception of teacher evaluation at the
schools with the highest and lowest support for performance-based compensation
reform would provide deeper insight as to what individual schools are doing to create
highly supportive (or deeply resistant) environments for performance pay.
Lastly, this analysis suggests that the labels assigned to teachers in accordance with
the teacher evaluation system could affect their attitudes. It would be interesting to
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explore how teacher’s behaviors were affected by labels, particularly since Aldine, for
the time being, has no high-stakes consequences attached to its evaluations.
Conclusion
For the past thirty years, policy makers have experimented with the idea
of performance-based pay as way to improve student test scores. Existing literature
suggests that the impact of these programs is mixed, and prompts a further look into
teacher support of this type of initiative. The Aldine Independent School District
presents a unique opportunity to examine teacher attitudes towards performance-based
compensation reform because the district has within the last two years implemented
a new, modern, teacher evaluation system that uses a highly validated rubric and
student growth percentiles to measure performance. No studies regarding teacher
attitudes towards merit pay have had this type of evaluation system, designed to be
exceptionally objective and provide extensive support and feedback to its teachers.
The results from Aldine teacher survey suggest that three themes drive teacher
support or opposition to performance-based compensation: control, fairness, and trust.
Control matters as teachers need to feel empowered be gritty and autonomous in
their classroom. Fairness of the evaluation system is essential to teachers embracing
compensation reform, as they do not want their salary to be influenced by exogenous
factors. Culture, defined as the level of support between a teacher and his peers and
administrator, manifests as teachers determine whether to trust the design of the
evaluation, and incorporates many principal competencies, such as communication,
management style, and usefulness of feedback.
This conclusion has policy implications for both Aldine and school districts
across the country. As new evaluation systems and compensation reform gain
increasing momentum, districts need to consider how to most effectively implement
policies. AISD hopes to implement a new compensation system aligned to INVEST
for the 2015-2016 school year, which means the district is currently poised to make
decisions about how to best execute the implementation process. As research indicates
that policies that have teacher support are implemented more smoothly, efficiently,
and effectively, districts looking to develop new compensation systems have a vested
interest in generating positive attitudes towards performance-based pay.
The results from this study indicate that teacher’s sense of control, perception
of the evaluation system, and trust in their school culture are incredibly important when
determining their support for merit pay. Unlike previous research that has suggested
that teacher beliefs are somewhat static (determined by things like years experience or
age of students), these three areas that can be somewhat manipulated through effective
policies, and allow districts to actually improve teacher attitudes before, during, and
after the design and implementation process.
Control, fairness and trust can be bolstered by effective school and district
leadership. For teachers to develop a sense of both control and support, a principal
must strike a somewhat challenging, but definitely feasible, balance between giving
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teachers autonomy and voice, while also providing the necessary supports through
effective communication and vision for the school. Fairness can be achieved through
an open system design process, where teachers have an opportunity to meaningfully
voice their concerns about the components of an evaluation system.
Additionally, Milanowski’s theory of socialization creates an enormous
implication for school and district leadership. The theory suggests that teachers learn
what to believe, or develop their opinions regarding policies like performance-based
pay primarily by following the example of their peers. This means that within every
school, district, and even state, there is the potential for a “tipping point” of sorts,
where the support of a certain number of teachers will exceed the threshold to drive
support for the school as a whole. By creating environments where some teachers feel
they have control, support, and believe in the value of their evaluation system, there is
the chance for the entire community to be positively influenced.
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